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Summary  findings
How would travel demand in Sao Paulo respond to  would not help much in attracting travelers from more
demand management  instruments? Could higher psoline  polluting (more congesting)  modes. (Thc same holds for
prices or lower metro fares (or changes in travel time)  subsidized  means of making  them run faster.)
help reduce congestion or pollution?  But there are important limitations in the scope of the
Swait  and Eskeland use cross-sectional  variation from  study. First, the smudy  does not discuss  optimal pricing. It
an urban travel survey to study the substitutability  in  merely  examincs  the likely sign and magnitude of the
demand between travel modes.  The method assumes  that  links between pollution and policy parameters such as
the set of trips is given (that is, origin-destination pairs  prices and travel speeds.  Second, aggregate demand by
do not change).  Choice of mode was found to be quite  mode could also depend on the city's shape and its travel
insensitive  to changes: all elasticities  were lower than 0.5  intensity (the number, direction, and length of trips). For
in absolute  value, and most were close to zero. While the  example, if a 'city'  stretches  along a constructed metro
sensitivity  of modc choice to relativc travel times (that is,  line, the study would not capture such a phenomenon,
speeds)  was somewhat greater than that to costs, the  since sensitive  trip generation is exduded. These issues
general finding is that mode choice is quite inflexible.  So,  are not examined in the study.
subsidies  to less  polluting (less  congesting)  travel modes
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such as changes in farcs and travel times? The question is relevant from many perspectives -
here the motivation is whether blunt instruments such as chalniges  in gasoline prices or bus
fires  can assist in providing reductions in negative external effecLs  such as pollution and
congestion. The authors do not discuss how opilmnalpricing  rules would depend on demand
parameters (it depends  on the available instruments, as well as un the objective function), but
show how changes in emissions (including the sign) depend on demand parameters, inter
alia
This study uses an econometric technique to study the flexibility in mode choice. The
data set is a travel survey of households from 1987. and cross-sectional variation is exploited
to make inference  about how flexible households  are, givzn cach trip's origin and destination.
Mode choice is found to be quite inflexible (but more sensitivc to changes in travel
times than to changes in fares and costs) - all elasticities are less than .5 in absolute value and
most are near zero. This finding is generally in line with what is found in the literature on this
topic. Thus, it would be hard to justify subsidies to the less polluting modes by referring to
the traffic they attract from the more polluting ones.
The  limitations in  the  study's  scope shculd be recognized, however. Aggregate
demand by mode could depend, in addition, on the number, direction and length of trips, on
"city shape" (which may or may not be amenable to demand management) - issues not
examined in this study. As an example, if one has observed that a city "streches" along a
newly constructed metro line, the study would not be able capture such a phenomenon, since
it does not capture flexibility in trip generation.
I1.0 INTRODUCTION
External effects are associated with total  transport in  a  city, as  well as  with  its
distribution by transport mode and by details on how each of these modes are operated. With
pollution generation, for instance, buses and cars can be made less polluting by technical
modifications, but changes in travel demand patterns -- brought about by fiscal instruments
such as taxes and subsidies -- can also provide cheap pollution reductioiis if consumers can
easily adjust.'
One basic reason for considering  fiscal instruments  to reduce air pollution is that they
circumvent the need for monitoring  emission sources, without which one cannot implement
first-best instruments such as emission taxes.  Particularly in a developing country context,
such monitoring can be quite expensive, if not impossible. Thus, it seems  expedient to
consider alternative means of control, such as taxation of fuels and/or vehicle ownership.  Part
of  such a consideration will be to investigate whether demand for polluting  goods and
services is  responsive to  instruments such  as taxes  and subsidies. Such responsiveness
determines the emission reductions that demand management instruments can provide. For
instance, if intermodal substitution  is low (as much of the literature indicates), then subsidies
to public transport can hardly be supported on the basis that they reduce private vehicle use,
accidents and  pollution.  On the other hand, if  demand for bus services is elastic, then
subsidies to such services can reduce private car traffic if much of the generated demand for
bus trips are trips that would otherwise have been made by car 2. However, for bus subsidies
to reduce pollution, not only must intermodal substitution  elasticities be high, but buses must
also be "cleaner"  ian  cars (say, per person kilometer). Another reason for studying the
IThe reader is directed to Jimenez and Eskeland (1990) and Eskeland  (1994) for a discussion of the motivation
for using fiscal instruments  to achieve  environmental  protection.
2 While we concentrate on relative vrices between modes, for which taxation of the more polluting modes is
similar to subsidization  of the cleaner ones (shifting modal shares), we should keep in mind that the former
would simultaneously  reduce demand  for transport in general, while the latter would increase it. This sudy  is
on modal distribution alone, and thus does not highlight  this distinction.
2sensitivity  of demand  for market  goods  is that  these  determine  the pollution  consequences  of
policy  changes  that  are implemented  for  reasons  other  than environmental  protection.
It can be useful,  in the following,  to have  in mind  a simple  model  of the generation  of
pollution  from urban transport.  Let E=ex, be a measure  of of emissions  (say, grams of
particulates),  where el are emissions  per passenger  kilometer  xi for travel mode i, and let
xjp,t1,..,p,,,,t,,I) be the demand for travel mode i, given prices  p,,..,p.,  travel  times  j,..,ti,  and
income  L.
If the pollution  control  agency  can  induce  a change  in the consumer  price  of modej, the
marginal effect  on total emissions  will be 3:
OE  l exhi  e  d
- - (er-+-xd. aPj  8pj  apj
Assuming  that the latter  element is zero 4, the elasticity of emissions  with respect to pj
will be the weighted  sum of the demand elasticities,  where  the weights  are each mode's share in
total emissions:
aE Pj  =  e,x,
While more involved models are  necessary to  assess the  welfare costs  (and the
attractiveness)  of changing  fares, prices and travel times, these expressions  are useful in
themselves  to assess  whether  a policy  change  can  deliver  emission  reductions.  For instance,  a
3 The  same  calculus  will  hold if the  agency  can  make  the  mode  fatr,  or moreless  attractive  by other  means.
4We have  thus assumed  tha marginal  emissions,  in the context  of chanMges  in consumer  pris  or travel
times,  equal avenge emissions.  This will often be a fair approximation.  Import  exceptions  are: i) if cars and
car trips  are not all equally  polluting,  and  the more  polluting  respond  mome  to the price  increases  (i.e. older  cars
get scrapped);  ii) if speeds  are not held  constant,  rmaming  taffic can  move  at speeds  that  are  less polluting;  iii)
if vehicle  occupay  rates change,  griven  that the chosen  denomiator m a demand  focused  study wil  be
emissions  per person-kilometer,  or perso-trip.
3reduced  fare for a "cleaner"  mode,  c, can deliver  emission  reductions  (assuming  the emission
factor  for  the public  mode,  e,>O),  only  if the  emission  elasticity  with  respect  top. is positive.
With two modes,  the cleaner  and "other",  the absolute  value  of the own  price  elasticity  for the
cleaner  must  not  exceed:
ee xc
The intuition  is very  basic:  The  own  price  elasticity  of the mode  which  subsidy  is being
increased  must not be "too large'"  compared  to the cross price elasticities  - otherwise  the
attracted  traffic  will  to a great  extent  be additional,  rather  than  attracted  from  the more  polluting
mode(s).  If the two  modes  play  the same  role  in emissions  (ecxr=evx 0, so that  the cleaner  mode
has a proportionately  larger  market  share),  then the cross  price  elasticity  has to be greater  than
the own price elasticity.  NWe  shall revert to some simple  calculations  like these when the
demand  parameters  have  been  established.
There  are other studies  and other  methodologies  that investigate  the determinants  and
responsiveness  of aggregate  demand, such as studies of vehicle ownership  and gasoline
demand. 5 These  studies  leave two gaps in empirical  knowledge  which  motivate  the use of
household  level data from travel surveys.  One is that they rarely allow a focus on all the
travel demand  modes,  let alone  the substitutability  among  them.  Another  is that the analyst  is
barred  fiom investigating  other  details  of the choices  involved.  For instance,  if a study  based
on aggregate  demand  data  reveals  that a city reduces  its gasoline  demand  as a result of higher
gasoline  prices,  it may be unable  to reveal  the extent  to which  this is: i) because  trips become
shorter (people  and employers  could move  closer  to each other, or establish  pairs in shorter
distances, without moving, or discretionary  trips could become shorter);  ii) because the
number of trips is reduced;  iii) because  cars become  more fuel efficient,  or, eventually;  iv)
5Examples are: Eskeland and  Feyzioglu, 1994 (Vehicle ownership and  gasoline demand), Pindyck, 1979
(gasoline demand), Kmpnick, 1992,  Stemer, 1990  and Oun et al., 1990 (liteature reviews).
4because  mode choice is affected,  and trips are rather made by foot or bicycle,  as an auto
passenger,  or by public  transport  modes.
Mode choice  models,  like the present  one, use survey  data to investigate  the role of
iv). 'Tus,  the  present model asks:for a specific set of trips (i.e. each trip is specified in terms
of person, origin and destination), by how much Is the choice of  travel mode affected by
variables  such as time and money spent on each mode, or by an increase in the income level?
We use data on auto ownership  and tip-making fiom Sao Paulo, Brazil, collected
during the  1987-Origin-Destination  Home Interview Survey by  the  Companhia do
Metropolitano  de Sao Paulo  - Metro. With tese  data, encompassing  a subsample  of 1,500
households,  we estimate  work and non-work  home-based  Muntinomial  Logit  (MNL)  mode
choice models. These are then nested with a MNL auto ownership  model, to capture the
effect that changes in the transport  system (e.g. travel cost changes  due to a gasoline  tax)
would  have  upon  the propensity  to own an automobile.  The  proposed  model  structure  reflects
a utility-maximition framework  within  which  the impact  of certain  fiscal  policies  on mode
choice,  auto usage  and ownership  can be examined.
It should  be noted that the available  data  are cross-sectional  in nature. Hence,  prices
are fixed in the sample;  the only variations  in prices,  travel times  and incomes  that can be
observed  are those  that vary  due  to other  characteristics  (e.g.  distances)  that are different  from
one observation  to another.  Despite  the shortcoming,  the model  system  developed  is typical
of what can be done econometrically  with the usual transportation  data sources available
today,  whether  in developing  or developed  counties.
The  remainder  of the report  is organized  as follows:
1.  a brief  review  of the literature  on auto ownership  and mode choice  modelling
is presented;
2.  we then  present  an overview  of the estimated  model  system,
3.  this is followed  by a presentation  of the estfimation  results;
54.  the estimated  models  are used to evaluate  the impact  of policy instruments
such as taxes  and subsidies,  to be used  in analysis  of policy  objectives  such  as
reduced  pollution;
5.  we conclude  with a discussion  about the results of the research and their
implications  for future  work.
62.0 LITERATURE  REVIEW
We present in this section a brief literature  review covering transportation  and
economic  modeling  efforts  aimed  at evaluating  the impact  of fiscal  policies  on the ownership
and use of the automobile,  with  special  emphasis  on LDCs.
There  is a well-developed  US literature  on automobile  ownership,  but its emphasis  is
on the vehicle-type  and brand  choice. It is a very sophisticated  literature,  but many of the
problems it deals with (e.g., multiple-vehicle  households;  see Mannering,  198') may be
peculiar  to developed  nations,  if not almost  strictly  to the US. There  is also  much  interest  in
the timing  of the vehicle  replacement  decision. Much  effort  is also  expended  on econometric
issues  that arise  from  the use of panel  (i.e., longitudinal)  data, something  virtually  unknown
in LDCs  (e.g.,  see  Golob,  1990;  van Wissen  and Golob,  1992).
Train's (1986)  work on auto ownership  and utilization  in California  is of some
relevance. He models  the joint decision  of auto ownership  and utilization  in a consistent
demand  systen.  The discrete  dependent  variable  is the choice  of the number  of vehicles  to
own by make/modeUvintage,  and the continuous  dependent  variable  is the annual VMT
(vehicle  miles  traveled)  for each  vehicle. This  is at a far greater  level  of detail  than available
in the Sao Paulo  data,  which  has only  information  on the number  of vehicles  owned. Train's
models  were subsequently  utilized  by the California  Energy  Commission  to study  gasoline
consumption  and pollutant  generation  in the state. More  recently,  these models  have been
updated  and recalibrated  with  new  data.  (These  results  are as yet unpublished,  however.)
Stanovnik  (1990) compared  the effect of income on auto ownership  in several
Yugoslavian  republics.  Probit  models,  using  the single  variable  income,  are fit to individual
household  observations.  Despite  the parsimony  of the specification,  it is shown  that income
is a very important  determinant  of auto ownership  in that country.  This is also certinly
expected  to be the case  in Brazil,  as borne  out  by previous  work  of Swait  (1981,  1985).
7Brownstone  and Golob (1992)  calibrated  orderd  p obit models  of choice between
driving and ridesharing  for work trips in Southern  Califomia. Their models show that a
combination  of incentives  could  potentially  increase  ride-sharing  by up to 18%,  which  in turn
has implications  for  air pollution  control.
83.0 MODEL  STRUCTURE
3.1 Introduction
To meet the objective  of producing  a tool that permits  the examination  of the impact
of travel demand  management  options  (e.g.,  gas'ine  tax, automobile  ownership  tax, public
transport subsidies)  on the production  of pollutants by personal  vehicle travel, we have
developed  a Nested  Multinomial  Logit  (NMNL;  see McFadden  1981,  Ben-Akiva  and Lerman
1985  for  descriptions  of this model  form)  simultaneous  choice  model  of
*  auto ownership  state  (none  versus  one or more  automobiles);
*  work  home-based  modc  choice;
*  non-work  home-based  mode choice.
In the following  pages  we describe  the rationale  behind  the model  structure.
3.2 The Automobile  Ownershp  Model
Auto ownership  in a developing  country  such as Brazil is influenced  by a number  of
factors, but most importantly by sunple economic  considerations:  is vehicle ownership
affordable  to a given household?  The decision  of whether  or not to own an automobile  is in
large part a function of a household's  socioeconomic  sttus,  proxied in large part by its
income.
Nonetheless,  other  factors  do influence  auto ownership:
the amomobile is a staus symbol for Brazilians, many  of whom  are 'willing  to
undertake  the cost of vehicle  ownership  while controlling  utilization  (so as to
minimize  operating  costs).  During  the late 1970's  and early 80's, when  Brazil
operated  under severe  fuel shortages  and was putting  into operation  the fuel
alcohol  program,  the rate of increase  in the vehicle  fleet did not appreciably
9drop, but utilization  of the fleet  certainly  did. This lends  some  credence  to the
hypothesis that the demand for automobiles  is somewhat insensitive to
ownership  and operating  costs,  insofar  as the car is a status  symbol;
it is our personal  experience  that Brazilians  buy great quantities  of vehicles
through  financing  or consortia  (the latter  are temporarily  convened  purchasing
cooperatives  for durable goods, operating long enough for a group of 100
individuals,  say, to acquire  automobiles  at the rate of two or three a month);
this causes the income constraint on vehicle purchase to be expressed (and
perceived) in terms of the affordability of monthly payments rather than long-
term  tradeoffs between vehicle ownership and  other options (e.g.,  home
ownership,  education);
- transportation system accessibility is also a factor to  be considered in the
modeling  of auto ownership,  since it simultaneously  describes  the financial
impact  that vehicle  use has on auto ownership  and the benefits  derived  from
having an automobile  available.  It is an empirical  question,  of course, as to
whether the accessibility experienced by the various members of a household
(i.e. heads of household  as compared  to other workers)  are equally important
in affecting  the demand  for automobiles,  or whether  different  trip purposes
(e.g.  work  vs. non-work  trips)  affect  the demand  differentially.
To account  for all these factors,  we have  proposed  the overall  model  structure  shown
in Figure 1. The decision  tree depicted  in the figure  reflects  the assumption  that automobile
ownership  is a higher-level  decision  than  that of the specific  modes  chosen  for work and non-
work trips by different  members  (e.g. the head of household,  secondary  workers,  etc.) of a
household. As  such, the  decision to  own a  vehicle is  determined (in  part)  by  the
ransportation  needs of household  members,  represented  in Figure  1 through  the lower-level
decisions of  which mode to use for work and non-work  trips. Other determinants  of
ownership  will be income,  status-fulfillment  needs and so forth,  as discussed  before.  Hence,
10Figure 1 - Overll  Structure  of the Auto Ownership  Model
No Autos  1  + Autos
Head  of  Other  Head of  Other
Household  Members  Household  Members
/  \/\
Transport  Transport  Transport  Transport
System  System  System  System
Aocessibility  Accessibility  Aocessibility  Accessibiity L  Work  Trips  Work  Trips  Work  Trips  Work  Trips
Non-Work  Trips  Non-Work  Trips  Non-Work  Tnps  Non-Work  Trips
we define  the indirect  utility  fimction  U..,, the utility  of automobile  ownership  for household
n, to be given by
U9.1  4-  n*I+ + ;,i+
=  pI+  + fiy  In Y.  +PmHS.S  +PcC.  +  0°n  +  yL.  +  )
8;TAnJ  + +  Efl*I+
where
J+  =  P[I + P. In  Y.  + PHHSS.  + PrC +000,, +  -yL +  STA J. is the deterministic  (or
systematic)  component  of  the utility  function;
8N.I+  is an error term, the  characteristics  of which are to be specified;
Y,,  is the income  for  household  n, included  in the lugaritbmic  form;
11HS",  is equal to I if the hiead  of household  has a high school education or less, zero
otherwise;
C,,  is equal to one if the head of household has completed  a college-level education, zero
otherwise;
0°  is equal to one if the household  owns its home, zero otherwise;
L.  is a vector of 15 residential location dummies, representing  a 16 macrozone
division of the Sao Paulo urban area;
TAnl+,  = (TAt.-,w  TA.,"  T,  TA,T<,"),  represents  the impact  of the tramsport  system on the
demand for automobiles  via the accessibility  afforded to the head of household versus
all other members, for work and non-work trips. It has elements TAZa,,  which are the
transport system accessibility  for an individual of type r (head of household, other
members) from household n for trip purpose s (work, non-work), when the
household's automobile  holdings are a vehicles (a =0, 1+); and
+1 P,  Hs, 3c, 0  y, S  are unknown  paraneters  to be esdmated  from data.
The  corresponding utility  of  not  owning  a  vehicle  is  given  by  the  following
expression:
U  = V..O  + C..O  = 8TA4 0+ F-.O  (2)
Because of  identification restrictions, 6 the utility of  zero vehicles has only  the transport
accessibility vector TA.. 0
7 and the stochastic term.
If  it  is  assumed that  F.... and  F..+  are  identically and  independently Gumbel
distributed, the probability that a utility-maximizing  household owns an automobile is given
by the binary logit model
P-,=  exp[V.,,+]  (3
exp[Vl*ol+  exp[VIj+]  1+exp[-(V.,  +-V o()3
61n  discrete choice models of the type estimated in this research, it is not possible to identify the effect of socio-
demographic variables on all the altematives (in this case, both 0 and 1+ automobiles). Instead, one of the
alternatives must be used as a base (implicitly setting the corresponding parameter to zero) and the relative
effects of the socio-demographics  on the remaining  altematives  can then be estimated.
7The elements of the TA vector vary  depending upon the alternative,  hence it is possible to identify the effect
of transport accessibility on both alternatives  0 and 1+ automobiles.
12where  V..,. and  V.J are  the  deterministic components of  utility fimctions (1) and  (2),
respectively.
We now explain more fully how the impact of changes in the transport system will be
reflected in model (3). McFadden (1981) and Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985, chapter 10)
explain that a  measure of  transport system accessibility that is  consistent  with  utility
maximizing behavior  in a hierarchical  decision structure such as shown in Figure 1 is
TAi  = Ini Eexp(V,  (4)
termed the "logsum" for obvious reasons. To define the terms in (4),  TA,  is the transport
system accessibility for an individual of type r (hcad of household, other members) from
household n for trip purpose s (work, non-work), when the household's automobile holdings
are a vehicles (a=O, 1+). The term  is the systematic utility of choosing transport mode j
from among the available set C,,  for person type r and trip purpose s. These modal choice
utilities must be estimated from appropriate models to permit the evaluation of (4). We shall
return to this subject subsequently.
As a measure of transport accessibility,  the logsum has two interesting properties:
a  it is monotonically  increasing  with respect to choice set size; and
*  it is monotonically  increasing  with respect to the systematic  modal utilities.
Hence, adding an altemative to the choice set of the lower level decision cannot decrease the
utility of auto ownership at the higher level; similarly,  improving the utility of the auto drive
mode (e.g. by  decreasing automobile operating costs) cannot decrease the utility of auto
ownership.
In addition, Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) show that the logsum is  actually the
expectation of the maximum of Gumbel-distrbuted variates. Hence, we can interpret the
differences in transport accessibility afforded by different levels of automobile ownership,
implicit in expression (3), to be the difference  between the maximum utility yielded by the
lower-level modal choice decision (see Figure 1), given no automobile  in the household, and
13the maximum utility yielded by the lower-level modal choice decision when the household
owns at least one automobile. To see this more clearly, isolate the terms in (3) containing
only the transport accessibility variables,  and note that
n,l+  1+ exp[...  +8(TA4 0 - TA,, 1+)]
Thus, all other things being equal, as the transport system accessibility for a household
increases because of o-ning  an automobile, the probability of its owning an automobile
increases (it is expected that 8 > 0).  Conversely, as the costs of vehicle operation increase
(making it more expensive to use the automobile for work and non-work trips), one would
expect the utility of auto-related modes to decrease, decreasing the accessibility variables,
therefore leading to a smaller likelihood  of owning a vehicle.
An examination of the  1987 Sao Paulo O/D survey subsample of 1500 households
available for this analysis shows the distibution of auto ownership seen in Table 1. We have
only modeled the frequency of owning one or more vehicles among SLo  Paulo households,
aggregating the two higher categories in Table 1.  The reason for this is that the motivation
for ownership of the second (or higher) vehicle can be quite different from that for the first
automobile. The data we are utilizing, since it was not collected with the explicit motivation
of modeling auto ownership, does not provide much basis for detailing auto ownership level
beyond the first  All possible households  are utlzed,  but as has been made clear before, we
are modeling the ownership of one or more  vehicles.
Before continuing to the mode choice models, we wish to also make clear that in our
modeling  system we  are  maintaning  residential and  employment locations fixed.  This
precludes modeling the effect of transport system accessibility (specifically,  as impacted by
the fiscal policies  we consider) on these longer-term  decisions.
14Table 1 - Simple Automobile Ownenhip  Distribution
Number  of Vehicles  % of Households




3.3 The Mode Choice  Models
In the exposition about the structure of the auto ownership  model, it was made clear
that the estimation of work and non-work mode choice models would be required. These
models are to be used to estimate the logsum variables in model (3), which reflect the effect
that changes in the transport system (inasmuch  as that system can be expressed through the
mode  choice models) might have  on  auto  ownership. In  this  section  we discuss the
specification  of the mode choice models.
First, however, we wish to make some comments  concerning  the definition  of trips to
be modeled. The 1,500 household sample of trips includes a total of 9,331 trip records.
These are distributed as shown in Table 2. To capture the inpact of transportation system
accessibility on auto ownership,  we have calibrated mode choice models for work and non-
work (recreation, personal business, health, shopping) trip purposes. In addition, we have
used only home-based trips (i.e., trips that originate at or are destined to the trip-maker's
residence)  in the proposed  model system. There are two reasons  for this:
first, and foremost, the modeling of non-home-based  trips (e.g. the trip taken from
work to a supermarket  before heading home from work) is very complex  and actually
requires modeling  of activity  patterns rather than single  trips;
15Table 2 - Sample Trip Purpose  Distribution
Number of  % of Trips
Trip Purpose  Trips  (Unweighted)
Work, Home-Based  4045  43.4
Non-Work, Home-Based  2149  23.0
School, Home-Based  1621  17.4
All Non-Home-Based  1516  16.2
Total Trips  9331  100.0
as shown  in Table 2, they comprise a  relatively small portion of  the total  trips
(16.2%), so the omission  is not felt to be a srious  one.
We have omitted from the model system all non-homrie-based  trips as well as all home-based
school trips.- This implies that 66.4% of the trips made in Sao Paulo are actually included in
the model system.
3.3.1  The Home-Based  Work Trip Mode Choice  Model
A little over 40%/o  of all trips in Sao Paulo are estimated to be work home-based,
which makes it the single largest trip purpose. The following  eight modes are present in the
data:
1.  Auto Drive
2.  Auto Passenger
3.  Bus/Trolleybus
4.  Metro/Suburban  Train
SThe omission of home-based school trips from dte  scope of our modeling work is a  relatively arbitrary
decision, mainly guided by the significat  amount of work involved  in such an effort. Specifically, one would
have to develop models of tripmaking behavior for the elementary,  secondary and university levels (for an
example of such models, see Swait et al., 1984). We also felt that the addition of this trip motive would not
introduce  substantive  differences  in the policy  analyses undertaken.
16Table 3 - Estimation  Sample Distribution  of Home-Based  Work Trip Mode Choice
% of Trips
Mode  (Unweighted)
Auto Drive  20.4
Auto Passenger  4.5
Bus/Trolleybus  40.6
Metro/Suburban  Train  18.6
Employer-Sponsored  Bus  5.5
Bicycle or Walk  9.0
Motorcycle  1.6




However, because of extremely low choice frequencies in the available data, the taxi mode
had to be dropped  from the analysis. 9
Table 3 shows the distribution of work trips by mode in the estimation data set.
Approximately  26.5% of all work trips are made by motorized private modes (auto drive,
auto passenger and  motorcycle), 5.5% are made by  employer-sponsored  bus  (which  is
intermediate  between  the private and public transport modes),  9.0% are bicycle or walk trips,
and the remaining  59% are made by the public  modes (bus and metro/suburban  train).
The specification of modal utilities is hypothesized to depend upon the following
factors:
1.  Travel Time: Utilizing network-based  estimates,  provided by the Metro company,
for automobile,  bus and metro travel times, we have used auto travel times for
the auto drive and auto passenger modes. In the case of motorcycle, we have
assumed that actual travel time is proportional  to auto travel time. The travel
9Extremely  low aggregate  choice frequencies  for an alternative  generally  creat  empirical  (as opposed  to
theoretical)  parameter  identification  problems  that can  only  be resolved  by obtaining  more  data,  or baning  ta
option,  omitting  the  alternative.
17time for the walk/bicycle mode is assumed to be proportional to interzonal
network distance. In the case of employer-sponsoTed  bus, the actual travel
time is asswned to be proportional to private automobile travel time. And
finally, the travel times provided for bus and metro/train were utilized for
those modes. For notational purposes,  we denote the travel time for mode j for
individual k as t,,.
2. Travel Cost: Metro provided an average automobile ownership and operating cost
per km, which is assumed to hold for the auto drive and passenger modes. It is
assumed that the ownership and operating cost of a motorcycle is proportional
to the automobile cost. At the time of the survey, bus fares were an average of
USS0.25 and metro/train fares US$0.22. Because we did not have available
information on number of transfers required between zone pairs for bus and
metro trips, we have the situation of an invariant mode price. This forced us to
utilize a specification of travel cost (c%,  is the notation for the travel cost for
individual k, mode j, from home to work or vice-versa) divided by household
income (denoted by  Y., which is  the  nth  household's income) to  permit
identification of a travel cost impedance for the bus and metro/train modes. 10
To maintain  consistency, tis  variable was used for all modes." 
3.  Socio-demographic  Factors:  In  addition to  the  travel  impedance measures
considered above, it was hypothesized that modal utility depends upon the
educational level of the head of household  n (HS. and C., previously defined),
home  ownership (0,,  also  previously  defined),  gender  of  the  head  of
household (G,, equal to 1 if male, 0 otherwise), whether the traveler is head of
household (HH,,  equal to  I  if traveler is head of household, 0 otherwise),
10The  only alternative  to this would  be to exclude  the cost  variables  for these  two mode  from  their respective
utility  functions,  which  is not a very palatable  option.
IIThis specification  reflects  the assumption  that the marginal  disutility  of travel  cost decreases  with increasing
income.
18whether the occupation of the head of household is an industrial laborer (L,,
equal to  1 if head of household is  an industrial laborer, 0  otherwise) and
whether the occupation of the head of household is in the service industry (SI.
equal to I if the head of household holds a service industry job, 0 otherwisie).
However, it was felt that the effect of these sources of consumer heterogeneity
should  be  permitted  to  differ  between private  modes  (auto  drive,  auto
passenger  and  bicycle/walk),  non-private  modes  (bus,  metro/train  and
employer bus) and a base mode (arbitrarily  taken to be the motorcycle).' 2
On the basis of these factors, we define a linear-in-the-parameters  modal utility for
work trips as
k(n)J  =  k()J  k*(n)jvi  (6)
where  Vk,)  is the systematic utility for individual kVs  (who belongs to household n) work
trips by mode j, and the other term is the stochastic component. If the error terms are IID
Gumbel, the choice probability is
kw( j  exp(Fk()  ,  (7)
- expU  an)
Note  that  the  natural  logarithm of  the  denominator of  (7)  is  actually  the  work  trip
accessibility measure defined in expression (4). Though we do not make it explicit in (7),
because of the inclusion of the head-of-household  dummy variable in the systematic utility
we are able to  differentiate between the work trips of the heads of household and other
household members.
The  symbol  C,("); in  (7) represents the  set  of  modal  altematives available to
individual k of household n for work trips (i.e. the  choice set). When estimating discrete
choice models based on revealed preference data, it is necessary to specify the rules whereby
the choice set is constructed. In the present case, the following  rules were applied:
12Another  hypothesis would be to permit these parameters to vary from mode to mode, but it is oftlen  the case
hat identification  problems  occur, so this compromise  approach was adopted  here.
191.  the auto drive and motorcycle  modes were only permitted if the household owned at
least one vehicle and the traveler was at least 18 years of age (to approximate the
availability of a driver's license, which was unavailable in the data); note, however,
that  the auto passenger mode was made available irrespective of  household auto
ownership level, based on the prior experience of Swait and Ben-Akiva (1987) with
the 1977 Sao Paulo O/D survey data;
2.  for all modes, the network impedance matrix had to indicate that a link between the
origin and destination zones was feasible.
3.3.2 The Home-Based,  Nonwork  Trip  Mode  Choice  Model
The second group of trip purposes that we have modeled is commonly known in
ransport parlance as home-based nonwork tnps. In our data, the actual trip purposes covered
are recreation, personal business, health and shopping. Hence, this group of trips covers a
more discretionary  type of travel that has as its origin or destination  the home.
Table 4 shows the modal split for the home-based work trips available for estimation.
Only  five modes  (auto  drive,  auto passenger, bus, metro/train and  bicycle/walk) were
observed in  the data, hence we are limited to  modeling these alternatives. Note that in
contrast to the work trips discussed above, auto passenger is far more utilized for non-work
trips, as would be expected.
The  same  linear-in-the-parameters specification  was  used  for  the  systematic
component of the modal utility for nonwork trips (denoted  k.))  as described for work trips
in Section 3.3.1. The choice set formation rules were also the same. The specification of the
stochastic component is also IID Gumbel, so that the probability for nonwork home-based
mode choice is also a multinomial logit model:
J exp(rkIw)j)'
20Table 4 - Estimation Sample Distribution  of Home-Based  Nonwork Trip Mode Choice
% of Trips
Mode  (Unweighted)
Auto Drive  23.3
Auto Passenger  16.6
Biis/Trolleybus  37.9
Metro/Suburban  Train  12.5
| Bicycle or Walk  9.7
3.4 Built-in Assumptions and Restrictions of the Model System
Before proceeding to  present the  model estimation results, we now take  a  few
moments and examine some of the built-in assumptions and restrictions embodied in the
model system represented by expressions (3), (7) and (8) and depicted graphically in Figure
1.  Only home-based work and nonwork (recreation, personal business, health
and shopping) trips  are considered, which accounts for approximately two
thirds of the trips in the Sao Paulo metropolitan area (as estimated with our
sample data).
2.  As  stated before, the  models assume that the  residential and employment
locations remairn  unchanged in the face of changes in the accessibility of the
transport system (interpreted in the spirit of the accessibility variables defined
in expression 4). That is to say, a consumer facing a work trip will respond to
changes in the transport system by changing his or her mode of travel, not by
moving residence to  a  more convenient location  or  changing to  a  more
conveniently located job. The relaxation of these assumptions would require
21the modeling  of residential  location  and 'Nork  trip distribution,  both of which
would  require  large-scale  modeling  efforts  beyond  the scope  of the study and
available  data.
3.  The models  also assume  that a consumer's  discretionary  travel behavior  (i.e.
nonwork trips) will be affected by transport system alterations  only by
changing  mode  utilization  patterns.  The  modeling  of the decisions  to not make
a discretionary  trip  or change  its destination  would  require  the development  of
trip generation  and distribution  models.  The former  are an especially  daunting
prospect  since the prediction  of the number  of trips to be taken has always
been  a difficult  task in transportation  demand  analysis.
224.0 MODEL  ESTIMATION  RESULTS
In this section wc prcsent the cstimation results for thc two mode choice models and
the  auto  ownership model. Howevcr,  we  shall invcrt the  ordcr of  presentation of  the
estimation results, with respect to the presentation  of the model structure in Section 3.0. In
essence, we shall be "ascending"  the ovcrall structurc  depicted in Figurc 1.
4.1 The Work  Mode  Choice  Model
Table 5 shows the maximum likelihood parameter estimates and their asymptotic t-
statistics, based upon the estimation sample of 2,826 home-based work trips. On average,
each trip had allocated  to its choice set 4.9 altematives.
The overall goodness  of fit statistics  are
p 2 = I  LL()  /  LL(0)  (9)
and
=  =  I  -[LL)-K]/LL(0)  (10)
where LL(B)  is the sample log likelihood  evaluated at the estimated  parameters, LL(0) is the
sample log likelihood  at the naive equiprobability  model, and K is the number of parameters
in the model. As with R2 in regression, these measures vary between 0 and 1. However, a
good model can have values as low as on the order of 0.2-0.3.  The second measure contains a
degrees  of freedom correction  to promote parsimony  in the model.
In the work trip mode choice model these goodness of fit measures are 0.429 and
0.422. respectively. These are quite high values, indicating the overall fit of the model is
quite good. This is supported by the percent of trips correctly  predicted by the model, which
is approximately 55%; this value should be compared to the random choice model, which
would correctly predict one seventh of the trips (i.e. the inverse of the number of modes), or
about 15% (=1/7, where 7 is the total number of modes represented  in the data).
23Tablc 5 - Home-Based Work Trip Mode Choice Model Estimation Results
FULL MODEL
VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS  Parameter Estimates'
Alternative-Specific  Constanb
Auto Drive  5.13 (7.4)
Auto Passenger  3.05 (4.3)
Bus  4.90 (7.2)
Metro/Train  5.67 (8.1)
Employer-Sponsored  Bus  3.09 (4A)
Bicycle/Walk  5.14 (7A)
Motorcycle  -0-
Travel Times
Auto Drive (min)  -0.0228  (4.7)
Auto Passenger  (min)  -0.0212  (-3.0)
Bus (min)  -0.0135  (-5.6)
Metro/Train  (min)  -0.0209  (-8.0)
Employer-Sponsored  Bus (min)  -0.0375  (-5.6)
Bicycle/Walk  (km)  -0.3741  (-15A)
Motorcycle  (min)  -0.0539  (-4.1)
Travel Cost/Household  Ineome (US$/  #
of Minimum  Salaries)
Auto Drive  -L i047 (-2.6)
Auto Passenger  -v.5896  (-5.2)
Bus  -0.0462  (-0.1)
Metro/Train  -5.471R  (-1.9)
Employer-Sponsored  Bus  -0-
Bicycle/Walk  -0-
Motorcycle  -0.2268  (-1.3)
Socio-Demographic  Effects (Auto
Drive, Auto Passenger,  Bicycle/Walk)
Head of household  has high  school  ed.  -0.786 (-1.9)
Head of household  has college  education  -0.921 (-2.0)
Household  owns  home  -1.204 (-2.8)
Traveler is male  -2.081 (-3.9)
Traveler  is head of household  1.532  (4.3)
Occupation:  Industry  -0.544(-4.5)
Occupation:  Services  -0.831  (-6.0)
Socio-Demogrmphic  Effects (Bus,
Metro/Train, Employer Bus)
Head of household  has high  school ed.  -0.953  (-2.3)
Head of household  has college  education  -1.755  (-3.8)
Household  owns  home  -0.972 (-2.3)
Traveler  is male  -2.594(-4.8)
Traveler  is head of household  1.091  (3.1)
Log Likelihood
At all parameters=0  4298.8
At convergence  -2456.6
P2  0.429
-i2  0.422
1. Asymptdoic  t-stntites in parnheses  24Examining  the estimated  parameters,  note that all the travel time coefficients  are
negative  and highly  significant.  The travel  cost  coefficients  are also negative,  but some  are
not significantly  different  from zero. Specifically,  the travel  cost  coefficient  for the bus and
motorcycle  modes have small t-statistics.  (The corresponding  coefficients  for employer-
sponsored  bus and bicycle/walk  cannot  be identified,  of course,  either because  there is no
direct  cost  to the consumer  associated  with  the mode,  as in the former  mode,  or because  we
have  assumed  that  there  are  no out-of-pocket  costs,  as in  the latter  mode.)
With respect  to the socio-demographic  effects  included  in the model,  we find that
they are all significantly  different  from zero at approximately  the 95% confidence  level.
Because  MNL  models  are driven  by differences  in utilities,  the impact  of socio-demographic
variables  must be identified  with respect  to a base alternative  (chosen  to be the motorcycle
mode  in the present  case).  For  example,  to interpret  the effect  that  being  a head  of household
has on modal utilities,  based  on setting  the referential  that it has no effect  on the utility  of
motorcycle,  the parameter  estimate  indicates  an increase  of 1.532  utiles  to the utility  of auto
drive,  auto  passenger  and bicycle/walk  compared  to a non-head  of household  traveler,  and an
increase  of 1.091  utiles  to the utility  of bus,  metro/train  and employer  bus compared  to a non-
head of household  traveler.  Essentially,  then, there is a higher propensity  for heads of
household  to use  the auto  drive,  auto  passenger  and  bicycle/walk  modes  as compared  to other
household  mcmbers,  all other things being equal. Similar interpretation  of differences
indicates  that  the signs  of the  other  socio-demographics  are also  reasonable.
4.2 The Nonwork  Mode Choice  Model
The 1,416  home-based  nonwork  trips  available  for  esfimation  of this model  were  each
allocated  an average  of 3.5 alternatives.  The aggregate  sample  distribution  of mode choice
was  previously  given  in Table  4.
25The parameter estimates and goodness of fit statistics for the non work mode choice
are presented in Table 6, under the rubric "FULL MODEL." In terms of overall goodness of
fit, p2 and its degree-of-freedom  corrected counterpart have the values of 0.267 and 0.254,
respectively. Though not as high as for the work trip model, these values nonetheless indicate
a well-fitting model. The percent of correctly predicted mode choice decisions is about 50%,
compared to the random choice model value of 20%.
Note that all travel time coefficients  are negative and significantly different from zero.
The travel cost coefficients for the auto drive and passenger modes are also negative and
significantly different from zero, but the bus mode coefficient (despite being negative) is not
significantly different from zero. The same outcome happened in the work trip model (see
Table 5). However, the travel cost coefficient for the metro/train mode is slightly positive,
though not significantly different  from zero.
In  general  the  socio-demographic variables are  not  as  important to  explaining
variations in nonwork mode choice as in work mode choice behavior. However, the signs are
in expected directions and the coefficients of head of household educational level, home
ownership and gender of traveler are significantly  different from zero.
Motivated by the undesirable positive sign of the Metro/Train travel cost coefficient,
we have estimated a reduced model that eliminates that coefficient, which is termed the
"REDUCED MODEL" in Table 6.13  In addition, the reduced model has eliminated the
educational level and home ownership variables from the bus and metro/train specifications.
This elimination of four coefficients increases the log likelihood from -1262.4 to -1262.8.
Hence,  the  chi-squared  statistic  to  test  the  hypothesis  that  these  coefficients  are
simultaneously  equal to zero is -2[-1262.8+1262.4]  = 0.8, with 4 degrees of freedom. This
test  statistic is  compared with the  critical value of 9.49 at the  95% confidence level.
13We also  attempted to  estimate models that  eliminated socio-demograp'ic variables,  in  the  hope that
correlations  between  bus cost and certain  consumer  characteristics  might  explain  the positive  sign.  The cost
parameter  continued  to be non-significant  and  positive.




VARLABLE  DESCRIPTIONS  Estimates'  Estimates'
Alternative-Speciric Constants
Auto Drive  -0.539 (-1.7)  -0.581 (-1.9)
Auto Passenger  -1.781 (-5.7)  -1.822 (-6.2)
Bus  -0.346 (-1.2)  -0.396 (-1.5)
Metro/Train  -0.322 (-0.9)  -0.354 (-1.1)
Bicycle/Walk  -0- 
Travel Times
Auto Drive (min)  -0.0161 (-2A)  -0.0159 (-2.3)
Auto Passenger (min)  -0.0212 (-3.2)  -0.0210 (-3.2)
Bus (min)  -0.0090 (-2.6)  -0.0090 (-2.6)
Metro/Train (min)  -0.0112 (-2.9)  -0.0113 (-2.9)
Bicycle/Walk  (kIn)  -0.3566 (-9.6)  -0.3567 (-9.7)
Travel Cost/Household Income (USS/#
of Minimum Salaries)
Auto Drive  -0.3268 (-3.7)  -0.3289 v-3.8)
Auto Passenger  -0.1886 (-3.0)  -0.1909 (-3.1)
Bus  -0.6212 (-0.6)  -0.7015 (-0.7)
Metro/Train  0.5268 (0.2)  -0-
BicycletWalk  -0-  -0-
Socio-Demographic Effects (Auto
Drive, Auto Passenger, Bicycle/Walk)
Head of household  has high school ed.  0.436 (1.5)  0.599 (3.0)
Head of household has college education  1.154  (3.7)  1.084(5.7)
Household  owns home  0.542 (2.4)  0.595 (3.9)
Traveler is male  0.290 (1.2)  0.278 (1.1)
Traveler is head of household  0.128 (0.5)  0.135 (0.5)
Socio-Demographic Effects (Bus,
Metro/ Train)
Head of household  has high school ed.  -0215 (-0.7)  -0-
Head of household has college  education  0.096 (0.3)  -0-
Household  owns home  -0.072 (-0.4)  -0-
Traveler is male  -0.446 (-1.9)  -0.458 (-2.0)
Traveler is head of household  0.327 (1.3)  0.335 (1.4)
Log Likelhood
At all parameters=0  -1722.9  -1722.9
At convergence  -1262A  -1262.8
P2  0.267  0.267
-p2  0.254  0.256
1.  Asymptotic  t-statistics  in  pantheses
27Therefore, we cannot reject the hypothesis  that these coefficients are simultaneously  equal to
zero.
On a more practical level, it is somewhat unfortunate that the metro/train travel cost
coefficient is essentially zero for this model. It is the probable result of the assumption of a
single fare of $0.22 for any trip, which is the only thing that could be done since we have no
information concerning  the number of transfers  necessary  between an origin and a destination
when the main mode is metro/train. In prior mode choice modeling exercises with Sao Paulo
data (see, for example, Swait and Ben-Akiva, 1987), based on the  1977 home interview
survey, a significant cost coefficient was found for the metro/train mode, though the travel
time coefficient was not significantly different from zero. In this model, we have the exact
opposite situation.
4.3  The Auto Ownership  Choice  Model
Of the  1,500 households available in the  sample, 1,116 were actually usable for
estimating the automobile ownership model due to missing data. To estimate the effect of
transport system accessibility on the number of automobiles owned by a household, we used
the work mode choice model and the reduced form nonwork mode choice model to estimate
the  transport accessibility variables (see expression 4)  for heads of household and  other
household members, creating thus four logsum varables.  However, since the logsums are
sequentially estimated rather than simultaneously  detrmined  with the parameters of the auto
ownership model, we have that the parameter estimates are consistent but not filly  efficient
(see McFadden, 1981, for a discussion of this point).
Table 7 presents the estimation results for the automobile ownership choice model. In
terms of overall goodness of fit, the binary logit model denoted "FULL MODEL" in Table 7
has  a  p2 value of  0.175,  with  a percent correctly predicted of  60% (compared  to 50%




VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS  Estimates'  Estimates'
Alternative-Specific Constants
Own 1+  Autos  -2.226 (-7.3)  -1.840 (-10.6)
Own 0 Autos  -0-  -0-
Socio-Demographic Effects
(Alternative 1+)
Natural Log of Household  Income
(Minimum Salaries)  0.2957 (4.5)  0.3061 (4.8)
Head of household  has high school ed.  1.105  (5.4)  1.169 (6.0)
Head of household  has college education  1.794  (7.0)  1.817  (7.7)
Household  owns home  1.199  (7.9)  1.108 (7.7)
Residential Location Dummy
Variables (Alternative 1+)
Centro  0259 (0.7)  --
Santana - N. Sra. do 6  0.858 (22)  -0-
Tatuapd - Vita Prudente  0.562 (1.7)  -0-
Jabaquara - [pirange  0.530 (1.4)  -0-
Jardins - ButantA  0.790(1.6)  -0-
Lapa - Vila Madalena  0.990 (22)  -0-
Pirituba - Perus  0.381(0.9)  -0-
Brasilandia - Tucuruvi  0.627 (1.7)  4-0
Guarulbos - Santa Isabel  0.158 (0.4)  -0-
Itaquera - Guaianazes  0.266 (0.8)  -0-
Mogi - Guararema  -0.160 (-0.4)  -0-
Maui - Santo Andre  0.814  (2.3)  -0-
Sao Bemardo - Diadema  0.463 (1-2)  -0-
Santo Amaro - Campo  Limnpo  0.164 (0.5)  -0-
Taboao da Serra - Juquitiba  -0.185 (-0.5)  -0-
Osasco - Itapevi  -0-  -0-
Estimated Transport  Accessibility
(both alternatives 0 and 1+)
Head of household  - work trips  0.1975 (3.1)  0.0993 (2.1)
Head of household  - nonwork trips  -0.0208 (-0.2)  -0-
Other members - work  trips  -0.1510 (-1.8)  -0-
Other members - nonwork trips  -0.1153 (-0.9)  -0-
Log Likelihood
At all parameters=0  -773.6  -773.6
At convergence  -638.1  -651.7
p2 0.175  0.158
-p2  0.144  0.149
1. Asymptotic  t-statistics  in  parethescs.for a random choice model). Thus, the twenty-four parameters in the full model are jointly
significantly different from zero.
Household income is  shown to  have  a  very  significant impact  on  automobile
possession, as would be expected. Other wealth-related socio-demographic  effects, such as
the educational level of the head of household and the household's ownership of the home,
are also  strong explanatory variables. Most of the  residential location dummies are  not
significantly different from zero, indicating that all other things having been accounted for,
location does not have any impact on auto ownership. This is an interesting characteristic for
the model to have, of course, since model inferences become  less dependent  upon the specific
urban form and current population distribution.
The accessibility (logsum) variables, which capture the  dependence of  the  auto
ownership decision on the lower level transportation decisions of work and nonwork mode
choice, yielded a mixed bag of results. The accessibility of the head of household for work
trips is a strong explanatory variable in the auto ownership model, but none of the remaining
logsums are  significantly different from zero at the 95% significance level. In addition,
except for the head of household work trip logsum, the accessibility  variables have negative
signs, which is counterintuitive.
Hence, the reduced form auto ownership model presented in the final column of Table
7 has eliminated all logsums except the head of household work trip accessibility, and has
also removed all residential location dummies from the specification. Thus, the hypothesis
that these 18 parameters are simultaneously  zero can be tested with the chi-squared statistic
of -2[-651.7  + 638.1]  = 27.2, which when compared to the critical value of 28.9 at the 95%
confidence level, leads us to conclude that the full and reduced models are not significantly
different from one another.
Our final specification  for the auto ownership model shows  the statistically significant
influence  that the accessibility afforded by an automobile  to the head of a household for work
travel has on the household's likelihood  to possess one or more automobiles. Ben-Akiva and
30Lerman (1985, Chapter 10) explain that as the coefficients of accessibility  variables approach
the value of 1.0, the greater the degree of jointness of the decisions being modelled; as the
coefficients approach 0.0, the greater the degree of independence between the decisions. In
the Sao Paulo auto ownership model we presented in Table 7, the work trip accessibility
variable for the head of household has a coefficient of about 0.10. This indicates that the
influence of head-of-household  work trip accessibility,  while statistically different from zero,
is not among the most determining factors of automobile ownership. Previous experience
indicates that household income (and more generally, wealth) should be the  constraining
factor for  the  automobile ownership decision. 14 Though somewhat surprising  that  the
nonwork accessibility measures are not significant, this result is not wholly unexpected. In
fact, it is quite consistent with usual Brzilian  middle-class household structures, which tend
to be single-worker  units.
1 4This intuition  is clearly borne out in the results of Section  5.0.
315.0 POLICY  IMPLICATIONS  OF THE MODEL SYSTEM
The  integrated automobile ownership and  mode  choice  models  reported  in  the
previous section have been used to evaluate the sensitivity of the three different decisions
modelled (work mode choice, non-work mode choice and automobile ownership)  to changes
in  different  policy  variables.  Specifically,  we  have  estimated  population-level  arc
elasticities's of the response variables with respect to changes in two modal characteristics
(travel time and travel cost) and to changes in household  income. These variables, especially
travel cost and household income, are of interest in this study because they would be directly
impacted by such policies as fuel and car taxes, and the existence of faster or cheaper public
transport modes potentially useful for controlling  air pollution generated by automobile use.
We will first examine the lower-level (as in Figure 1) modal choice models, then the
upper-level automobile  ownership choice model.
5.1  The Work Mode Choice  Model Results
Table 8 presents the own and cross arc elasticities of the work mode choice model
with respect to changes in the travel times of the automobile, bus and metro/train systems.1 6
The most sensitive mode is Metro/Train, which has an own time elasticity of -0.50; this is
followed by Bus, with a corresponding value of -0.30, which is the same own elasticity as
exhibited by the Auto Passenger mode; and finally, the smallest own elasticity is that of Auto
Drive, with a value of -0.20. Some of these values are quite similar to those of Swait and
Ben-Aldva (1987, Table 2a), who present Sao Paulo work trip arc elasticities (generated by
15The  arc elasticities  presented here were obtained by perturbing  the independent variables by a 10/o  increase
across the entire sample. Population-level estimates were obtained by sample enumeration using the limited
sample we have available. These were then expanded to the total population by employing weighting factors
provided by the Metro company. As presented, the arc elasticities have been nonnalized to be the percent
change in the response due to a 1%  change in the independent  variable. The selection of a 10% perturbation  to
calculate the  arc elasticities was purposefully small, so as to  more closely approximate point  elasticity
estimates.
1 6Note that changes in automobile  travel time affect both  the Auto Drive and Auto Passenger  modes.
32Table 8 - Work Mode Choice Travel Time Arc Elasticities
r_________  ________  _______Response  in  Mode.
Change in
Travel Time  Auto  Auto  Metro/  Employe  Bicycle/  Motor-
of...  Drive  Passenge  Bus  Train  r Bus  Walk  cycle
r
Automobile  -0.20  -0.30  0.10  0.10  .20  0.10  -0.10
Bus  0.20  0.30  -0.30  0.20  0.40  0.20  0.30
Metro/Train  0.10  0.10  0.10  -0.50  0.10  0.00  0.10
100% perturbations of travel time, instead of the 10% perturbations used here) based on a
mode choice model calibrated on 1977 data (as opposed to the data used in this study, which
was collected 10 years later). Their values and ours are contrasted  below:
Work Trip Mode Choice Own
Travel Time Arc Elasticity
Swait and Ben-
Mode  This Study  Akiva (1987)
Auto Drive  -0.20  -0.14
Auto Passenger  -0.30  -0.23
Bus  -0.30  -0.23
Metro/Train  -0.50  -0.02
Hence, the two sets of values are quite consistent with the exception of the rail mode; the
present study has a much higher rail arc elasticity than found in Swait and Ben-Akiva.1 7 For
the purposes of this study, however, the automobile modes are of the greatest interest, so it is
heartening  to see the consistency  between the two studies.
Table 9 shows the elasticities of the work trip mode choice model with respect to
changes in travel cost. The bus mode is predicted to be inelastic, a direct result of its very
small travel cost coefficient (see Table 5). The Metro/Train  mode is also essentially inelastic
1 7However, it is noteworthy that our estimate is quite similar to that reported in that same study for a different
model formulation (essentially  a simultaneous  captivity  and choice model), as evident in their Table 2b, where
the rail own elasticity  is reported  as being -0.30.
33Table 9 - Work Mode Choice Travel Cost Arc Elasticities
__________  ________  ________  Response  in Mode ...
Change  in
Travel Cost  Auto  Auto  Metro/  Employe  Bicycle/  Motor-
of...  Drive  Passenge  Bus  Train  r Bus  Walk  cycle
r
Automobile  0.00  -0.40  0.00  0.00  0.10  0.00  0.10
Bus  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Metro/Train  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.05  0.01  0.00  0.00
because, despite its larger cost coefficient, only a  small proportion of the population is
actually impacted by changes in this mode. 18 Finally, the work mode choice model predicts
that Auto Passenger  has an own cost elasticity  of -0.40 (these trips are predicted  to transfer to
the Employer Bus and Motorcycle modes), while the  Auto Drive mode is unaffected by
changes in travel cost. 19 The own travel cost elasticities from this and the Swait and Ben-
Akiva (1987,  Table 3a) study are again constrasted  below.
Work Trip Mode Choice Own
Travel Cost Arc Elasticity
Swait and Ben-
Mode  This Study  Akiva (1987)
Auto Drive  0.00  -0.02
Auto Passenger  -0.40  -0.07
Bus  0.00  -0.14
Metro/Train  -0.05  -0.25
I8Note  that  the elasficities  refer to the change  in population  demand,  given  a change  in the stimulus  variable.
Since  few  individuals  are affected  by the metro/train  mode  (i.e. not all origin/destination  pairs are served  by
metro/train,  even  as a part of the total  trip), changing  its characteristics  does  not as widespread  an impact  as
changing  auto  or bus  characteristics.
19A possible  reason  for the larger  impact  of travel  cost on the Auto  Passenger  mode,  compared  to the Auto
Drive  mode,  is that we have assumed  that passengers  have an out-of-pocket  cost proportional  to that of the
Auto  Drive  alternative.  In reality,  it is more  likely  that,  within  a household,  there  is no explicit  cost associated
with  the  passenger  mode,  so  we may  be overstating  the sensitivity  of the  mode.
34With respect to Auto Drive the two studies are in agreement as to the mode's inelasticity. Our
model predicts that the  Auto Passenger mode is more elastic than in  the  earlier study;
conversely, we predict the Bus and Metro/Train modes to be less elastic than found in that
study. Nonetheless, the conclusion that both studies point to a general insensitivity of work
mode choice with respect to travel cost changes seems inescapable.
The final result to be presented for the work trip mode choice model is given in Table
10, which presents the modal arc elasticities with respect to household income. The results
show that a  1% income increase most strongly affects the Auto Passenger and Motorcycle
modes by drawing trips to them.  The Metro/Train mode also gains some trips, but nothing
significant  Bus,  Employer Bus  and  Bicycle/Walk lose  trips  when  household  income
increases. Interestingly, an income increase (at least of the  10% perturbation used here and
given the existing income distibution  in the sample) is predicted to have no effect on the
Auto Drive mode. This means, of course, that the work trip mode choice model will exhibit a
certin  "stiffness" (or inertia, if you will) with respect to the impact of income changes on the
Auto Drive mode, which is of special interest in this study.




Auto Dnve  0.00
Auto Passenger  0.40
Bus  -0.04
Metro/Train  0.03
Employer Bus  -0.10
Bicycle/Walk  -0.03
Motorcycle  0.10
355.2 The Nonwork  Mode  Choice  Model  Results
Tables 11, 12 and 13 present the nonwork mode choice arc elasticity results given by
the reduced model of Table 6. The basic message of these tables is that nonwork mode choice
is approximately as "stiff' as the work mode choice results discussed previously. Hence, we
will simply point out a few differences between the two models:
*  with respect to travel cost, nonwork trips by Auto Drive show some (small)
elasticity, as compared to work trips, where the elasticity was zero;
*  for nonwork trips by  Auto Passenger the cost elasticity is about the same
magnitude as the corresponding Auto Drive value, and only a quarter of the
work trip Auto Passenger elasticity;
*  the household income arc elasticity of the automobile modes are about 0.07
for nonwork trips, which contrasts with 0.00 and 0.40 for the Auto Drive and
Auto Passenger  modes for work trips.
Again, the essential conclusion of these results is that mode choice for non-work trips
is quite inelastic with respect to travel time, travel cost and income changes, at least within
the bounds of the perturbations  tested and characteristics  of the sample data available.
Table 11 - Nonwork Mode Choice Travel Time Arc Elasticities
l______  _____  Response in Mode ...
Change in
Travel Time  Auto  Auto  Metro/  Bicycle/
of...  Drive  Passenge  Bus  Train  Walk
r
Automobile  -0.10  -0.30  0.10  0.10  0.10
Bus  0.09  0.15  -0.20  0.16  0.13
Metro/Train  0.02  0.03  0.04  -0.30  0.01
36Table 12 -Nonwork Mode  Choice  Travel  Cost Arc Elasticities
___________  Response  in Mode.
Change  in
Travel  Cost  Auto  Auto  Metro/  Bicycle/
of...  Drive  Passenge  Bus  Train  Walk
r
Automobile  -0.09  -0.08  0.06  0.06  0.04
Bus  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Metro/Train  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00




Auto  Drive  0.08




5.3 The  Automobile  Ownership  Choice  Model  Results
In this section we present the arc elasticities  of the reduced form automobile
ownership  model  (presented  in Table  7)  with  respect  to changes  in travel  time,  travel  cost  and
household  income. Because of the inclusion  of the transportation  system accessibility
variable  for  head  of household  work  trips  (see  the discussion  in section  3.2,  expression  (4))  in
the automobile  ownership  model, its arc elasticities  include  the effects of the perturbed
independent  variables  in the lower-level  model (see Figure 1). Hence,  the auto ownersbip
model  can  be sensitive  to changes  in the transportation  system  characteristics,  such as travel
time  or vehicle  operating  costs.
37Table 14 shows the arc elasticities for the automobile ownership model. The results
indicate that the ownership decision is basically unaffected by changes in travel time and
travel cost  in  the  range  tested (10% perturbations). With respect to  household income
changes, the arc elasticity of automobile  ownership is estimated at a low value of +0.1O.
Table 14 - Automobile Ownership Arc Elasticities
Arc
Change ...  Elasticity
Automobile Travel Time  -0.01
Bus Travel Time  0.01
Metro/Train  Travel Time  0.00
Automobile Travel Cost  0.00
Bus Travel Cost  0.00
Metro/Train  Travel Cost  0.00
Household Income  0.10
5.4 Effect on Emissions:  Example  Calculations
Analysis of demand management  instruments  to pursue emission reduction objectives  requires
more elements than those developed here. First, emissions of different pollutants should be
weighted by their relative contribution  to damages 20. This amounts to obtaining a sensible,
damage-weighted  scalar for emissions  (See equation 1.1,  in which emissions  is a scalar).
Secondly, since environmental damages are not of unique importance, one needs a
model which allows analysis of  the welfare costs of  demand manipulation  The general
20 Two  possible  approahes  are to base these  on a measure  of relative  non-compliance  with standards  for the
various  ambient  air  pollutants  (See  Weaver,  World  Bank,  1992),  or on specific  modeling  of the airshed,  physical
effects,  and  valuation  (Eskeland,  World  Bank,  1994).
38recommendation  in public finance is to tax emissions,  rather than to tax or subsidize  the more
and less polluting  goods and services.  Thus, an argument  for using taxes and subsidies  on goods
and services,  whose impact  on pollution is limited to the effects  through changes in demand (as
opposed to making each mode less polluting, per passenger kilometer),  will usually  rest on the
assumption that such instruments require less costly monitoring and enforcement (See, for
example, Devarajan  and Eskeland,  for an elaboration  of this point).
A less demanding,  though necessary intermediate  question, is to what extent changes in
relative prices or travel times can deliver emission reductions.  To illustrate  some calculations,
we shall remain  agnostic about  damage-weighted  emission factors, but  use the  demand
elasticities  estimated  for work-trips  (Tables  8 and 9), the modal  shares  for work trips (STable  3).
Table 9, with price (or cost) elasticities for the modal split of home-based work trips,
gives immediate answers for subsidies to  bus and metro/train. The metro/train own price
elasticity is significantly  different  from zero, but small, at -.05, and the bus own price elasticity
is not significantly  different  from zero. For both of these prices, however, estimated cross price
elasticities are all zero. Since, in the spirit of equation 1.3, it would be positive cross price
elasticities  with "more polluting"  modes that would drive  a possible  emission reduction,  we can
rule out that fare reductions  could reduce emissions (subject to caveats  in tems  of the demand
system that is estimated,  of course).
Also, the demand system appears unable to deliver emission reductions in response  to
fuel price increases  for automobiles,  as own price as well as cross price elasticities  are estimated
to be equal to zero.
One might also consider maldng the public modes more attractive to consumers by
other means than fire  reductions, for instance by  increasing their speeds. This  could be
implemented by administrative  fiat (privileging  lanes for buses), usually involving involving
implicit "taxation"  of other modes, or by explicit  use of taxes and subsidies.  In Table 9, we can
see that the responsiveness  of demand to travel times is greater than to costs (Table 8): For bus
and metro/train travel times, own time elasticites are negative and cross-time elasticities are
39positive. For metro/train  travel  times, the own time elasticity  is -.5, while cross time elasticities
are .1. Thus, using equation 1.3, reductions in metro/train  travel times can reduce emissions if
ecxWe,c 0<5, i.e. if total emissions from metro/train,  relative to emissions of all other modes, is
less than or equal to 5. In Table 3, we can see that the trip share of metro/rail is 18.6  percent.
This means reductions in travel times for the metro/train  would reduce emissions as long as the
emission factor for the metro is not five times as great as the weighted  average  for other modes,
which will surely be satisfied  under  all possible assumptions.
For a reduction  in travel  times for buses, ceteris  paribus,  calculations  are as follows. The
own time elasticity. -.3, applies to 40.6 percent of trips, while cross time elasticities  of .2 apply
to metro/train  and walk/bicycle,  with trip shares 18.6  and 9 percent,  respectively.  Assuming  that
metro/train  and walk/bicycle  can be considered not polluting, emission reductions will have to
be delivered  by the remaining  32 percent of trips, to which a cross time elasticity of .3 applies.
The result is that travel time reductions for buses would deliver emission reductions if the
emission factor for buses (per passenger kdlometer)  is smaller than or equal to  4/5 of the
weighted average for  other polluting modes, where other polluting  are  auto (drive and
passenger): 24.9 percent, employer-sponsored  bus: 5.5 percent, and motorcycle: 1.6 percent
(thus, dominated  by auto drive). According  to the authors'  experience,  pollution coefficients  for
buses may or may not be lower  han four fifths of what they are for cars, depending on the
weighting of contaminants (bu _s more intense in particulates, cars more intense in ozone,
carbon monoxide and lead), the characteristics  of fleets and fuels, and load factors (passengers
per vehicle).
Concluding,  travel time reductions  for metro/rail  would  reduce emissions, and for buses
they might reduce emissions. Of course, travel time reductions are attractive  to consumers for
other reasons also, but can generally  be delivered only at a cost 21. Travel time reductions can
therefore not be recommended  without much  more involved  analysis.
21 Krupnick  (1993),  making  rough  calculations,  indicate  that for projects  producing  travel time reductions,
consumers'  valuation  of the reductions  will  dwarf  the  emission  reductions.
40Finally, a  line of  inquiry emphasized in this study was to  investigate the  role of
endogenous  car ownership in an economy  where car ownership is not yet predominant among
households. Rather rigid demand systems had  been estimated in various countries, using
methodoligies based on the assumption that car ownership is  given. Thus, the possibility
remained that a "hidden" responsiveness of demand systems could rest in endogenous car
ownership,  if car ownership  appeared responsive  to measures  of relative  travel times and costs.
Table 14 demonstrates,  however, that car ownership shows little responsiveness  to any other
variable han the households  economic status. With the caveats necessary due to the data set
and the methodology,  therefore, it appears  that the responsiveness  to prices and travel times of
car ownership does not add significant flexibility to an overall model of modal split for Sao
Paulo.
416.0 CONCLUSIONS
Is urban travel demand amenable to demand management? This study provides a
limited part of the answer, since it takes as given the specific trips (origin-destination pairs)
that a sample of households undertake, when asking: how sensitive is the choice of travel
mode to changes in exogenous variables such as each mode's travel cost and travel time?
The present research strongly supports previous modeling efforts with Sao Paulo
travel data by showing that mode- and auto ownership decisions are relatively unresponsive
to changes in relative travel costs,  and also quite unresponsive to changes in relative travel
times (e.g. Swait and Ben-Akiva, 1987, who used data collected 10 years before the data
utilized in this modeling work). Considered together, the arc elasticities calculated using a
multi-tiered demand system of models for work mode choice, non-work mode choice, and
automobile ownership depict Sbo Paulo travellers as quite inflexible in their mode choice.
Own- and cross- elasticities with respect to travel time and costs are all less than 0.5 in
absolute value, and most are near zero.
Evidence  from another  Brazilian city,  Maceio,  located  in  the  under-developed
northeast of Brazil, also shows that work mode choice (one of the components of behavior
modelled here) is quite insensitive to travel time and income changes (see Swait and Ben-
Akiva, 1986; Swait et al., 1984). Macei6 is much poorer than Sao Paulo, so it is perhaps not
surprising that the former's elasticities are even smaller than those reported here. These and
other results mentioned above combine to  suggest a limited substitutability among travel
modes when trip origination and destination are predetermined. Thus, taxes and subsidies
could not significantly  reduce air pollution by removing riders from private vehicles to other,
potentially  less  polluting  modes,  unless  trip  generation  itself  is  responsive  to  such
instruments.22
22Some stylized  facts  for individual  intpretaon:  As recently  reported  in the Wall Street  Journal,  Bazilians
are already subject to the highest automobile sales taxes in the world, yet ownership of an automobile stil
looms large as a worthy goal in consumerse  minds (perhaps superseded only by the desire to own their own
42There are several ways to read the findings from the present study, however. To see
the study as confirming that urban travel demand is generally insensitive to parameters such
as travel times and costs would be mistaken: the study finds that the choice of travel mode,
given that a specific trip is undertaken, is unresponsive.  Thus, total demand for trips may be
sensitive to prices and travel times. Similarly, modal split may be responsive, if trip origins
and destinations are not considered given, as in the present study. As an example, if one has
observed the phenomenon that a city "stretches" its suburban expansion along a newly built
metro line (possibly a phenomenon of responsive aggregate travel demand which includes a
responsive modal split), then our study methodology  would not be able to detect it, since it
only investigates modal choice given residential and employer locations. To be specific, the
study can say notiing about how responsive a "city" is, either in the total demand for travel
or in its modal split. The study does find, however, that not much responsiveness is found in
the choice of mode for given trips.
One policy implication is that it would be hard to justify subsidies to modes that
require less road space or produce less pollution by referring to  the benefits in terms of
reduced congestion and pollution.
home). Less stylized, but notable: During the second  half of the 1970's,  Brazil was implementing  its renewable
alcohol-fuel program; fuel (whether gasohol or pure alcohol)  was expensive, scarce and rationed (e.g. gasoline
stations  within  50 kilometers  of any urban  area were closed  from  Friday  evening  through  Monday  moming).
The study conducted by Swait and Ben-Akiva (1987) used survey data collected in 1977, and so was subject  to
these conditions. They report that 32% of the work trips were by the Auto Drive and Auto Passenger modes.
Our sample, collected 10 years later, has 25% of work trips by those two modes (see Table 3). Thus, it appears
as if these modes have reduced their shares, even though it may be that these two shares are quite close. With
some, though limited  per capita income growth, and with a removal  of rationing mechanisms,  one would expect
increased use of auto modes. However, as the city and the sample has changed, it is difficult to analyze the
causes of these diffaences, or even whether they are significant
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